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Principles of knowledge, belief and conditional belief
Guillaume Aucher
1 Introduction
Elucidating the nature of the relationship between knowledge and belief is an old issue
in epistemology dating back at least to Plato. Two approaches to addressing this problem
stand out from the rest. The first consists in providing a definition of knowledge, in terms
of belief, that would somehow pin down the essential ingredient binding knowledge to
belief. The second consists in providing a complete characterization of this relationship in
terms of logical principles relating these two notions. The accomplishement of either of
these two objectives would certainly contribute to solving this problem.
The success of the first approach is hindered by the so-called ‘Gettier problem’. Until
recently, the view that knowledge could be defined in terms of belief as ‘justified true
belief’ was endorsed by most philosophers. This notion of justification, or “right to be
sure” as Ayer called it (Ayer, 1956), was therefore the key element relating knowledge to
belief, even though Ayer admitted that determining the general conditions needed to “have
the right to be sure” would be too complicated, if at all posssible. Gettier’s seminal three
page paper presents two counterexamples which shatters this classical analysis (Gettier,
1963).1 Following this publication, a large number of other definitions of knowledge were
proposed, analyzed and refined in order to determine the additional clause needed to define
knowedge in terms of belief. However, no consensus came out of this undertaking and the
exact nature of the relationship between knowledge and belief remains to this day elusive
(Lycan, 2006).
The second approach is related to the method employed by epistemic logicians such
as Hintikka or Lenzen to better understand and “explicate” the notions of knowledge and
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1 One of these two examples is the following. Suppose that Smith has strong evidence that ‘Jones owns a
Ford’ (1) (for instance, Jones has owned a Ford ever since Smith has known him). Then, because of (1) and
by propositional logic, Smith is also justified in believing that ‘Jones owns a Ford or his friend Brown is in
Barcelona’ (2), even if Smith has no clue where Brown is at the moment. However it turns out that Jones does
not own a Ford and that by pure coincidence Brown is actually in Barcelona. Then, (a) (2) is true, (b) Smith
believes (2), and (c) Smith is justified in believing (2). So Smith has a true and justified belief in (2). Intuitively,
however, one could not say that Smith knows (2).
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belief. In his seminal book (Hintikka, 1962), Hintikka examines the validity of various
principles with the help of a logical model based on the Kripke semantics of modal logic.
This publication sparked numerous discussions about the inherent properties of these epis-
temic notions, and a large spectrum of informational attitudes were explored ((Lenzen,
1978) provides a good overview of that period). Many axioms, viewed as reasoning prin-
ciples, were proposed and discussed, especially interaction axioms relating the notions
of knowledge and belief. This quest for reasoning principles somehow vanished in the
1980’s when epistemic logic was taken over by computer scientists to address other prob-
lems related to various applications. In the early 1990’s, however, new interaction axioms
relating knowledge and conditional belief were elicited by some researchers in artificial
intelligence (Moses and Shoham, 1993; Lamarre and Shoham, 1994).
To better grasp the relationship binding knowledge to belief, we review and examine
in this paper the validity of the different axioms (and inference rules) relating knowledge
to belief which have been proposed in the epistemic logic literature. In doing so, we are
bound to encounter many of the problems that epistemic logic has had to face in its rela-
tively short (modern) history. This paper is therefore more an exposition than a research
paper. However, we will also contribute to this area by providing conditions under which
the notion of belief can be formally defined in terms of knowledge, and vice versa. We will
also prove that certain convoluted axioms dealing only with the notion of knowledge can
be derived from understandable interaction axioms relating knowledge and conditional be-
lief.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will briefly describe the role that
epistemic logic has played in the development of computer science (and to a lesser ex-
tent in philosophy). We will also set the modeling assumptions that will be used in the
rest of the paper. Then, in Section 3, we will delve into our subject matter and review the
most common epistemic principles (i.e. principles pertaining to the notion of knowledge)
and doxastic principles (i.e. principles pertaining to the notion of belief) occurring in the
epistemic logic literature. In Section 4, we will review the interaction principles relating
knowledge to belief on the one hand, and relating knowledge to conditional belief on the
other hand. In Section 5, we provide the logical apparatus needed to formalize our ap-
proach. In Section 6, we will investigate formally under which conditions knowledge can
be defined in terms of belief, and vice versa. Finally, in Section 7, we will show that cer-
tain convoluted axioms for knowledge can be derived from simpler axioms of interaction
between knowledge, belief and conditional belief.
2 Prolegomena
2.1 Epistemic logic in philosophy and computer science
Following the publication of (Hintikka, 1962), philosophers and logicians tried to formu-
late explicit principles governing expressions of the form “a knows that j” (subsequently
formalized as Kj) or “a believes that j” (subsequently formalized as Bj), where a is
a human agent and j is a proposition. In other words, philosophers sought to determine
‘the’ logic of knowledge and belief. This quest was grounded in the observation that our
intuitions of these epistemic notions comply to some systematic reasoning properties, and
was driven by the attempt to better understand and elucidate them. Lenzen indeed claims,
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following Hintikka, that the task of epistemic logic consists “1) in explicating the epis-
temic notions, and 2) in examining the validity of the diverse principles of epistemic logic
given such an explication” (Lenzen, 1978, p. 15). As we shall see in the rest of this paper,
assessing whether a given principle holds true or not does raise our own awareness of these
epistemic notions and reveals to us some of their essential properties.
For many computer scientists, reaching such an understanding (via this kind of con-
ceptual analysis) is not as central as for philosophers, partly because the agents considered
in the “applications” of computer science are typically assumed to be non-human. Voor-
braak even claims that his notion of objective knowledge “applies to any agent which is
capable of processing information [and] may very well be a device like a thermostat or a
television-receiver” (Voorbraak, 1993, p. 55). In computer science, epistemic logic is often
viewed as a formal tool used to represent uncertainty in different kinds of settings.2 From
this perspective, a specific set of axioms and inference rules for knowledge and belief will
apply to a specific applied context. Originally, this interest taken in epistemic logic by
computer scientists stemmed from their observation that the notion of knowledge plays
a central role in the informal reasoning used especially in the design of distributed pro-
tocols. So, in a sense, the logical analysis of epistemic notions carried out by logicians
and philosophers provided computer scientists with formal models. These models were
‘used’ and developped further to address particular issues such as the problem of reaching
an agreement in order to coordinate actions in distributed systems (Halpern and Moses,
1990) or the problem of diagnosing electric circuits (Friedman and Halpern, 1997), or
even problems of computer security (Deschene and Wang, 2010). As a result of this shift,
the computability properties of various epistemic logics were investigated systematically
(Halpern and Moses, 1992) and other epistemic notions involving multiple agents were
introduced in epistemic logic (Fagin et al., 1995), such as the notion of distributed knowl-
edge and common knowledge (originally studied by the philosopher Lewis (Lewis, 1969)).
One should note that there is also a discrepancy between the analyses of the notion
of knowledge in epistemic logic and in (mainstream) epistemology. As Castan˜eda already
commented soon after the publication of (Hintikka, 1962), “Hintikka’s ‘K’ (‘B’) does not
seem to correspond to any of the senses of ‘know’ (‘believe’) that have been employed
or discussed by philosophers. But Hintikka’s systems are an excellent source from which
we may eventually arrive at a formalization of the philosophers’ senses of ‘know’ and
‘believe’ ” (Castan˜eda, 1964, p. 133). As it turns out, some recent publications bear witness
to a revival of the ties between epistemic logic and (mainstream) epistemology (Hendricks
and Symons, 2006; Hendricks, 2005).
2.2 Modeling assumptions
If we want to define knowledge in terms of belief and give a complete and accurate ac-
count of this notion, then we should not limit our analyses to knowledge and belief only.
Indeed, other related notions will inevitably play a role, such as the notions of justification,
2 (Fagin et al., 1995) and (Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995) are the standard textbooks in computer science
dealing with epistemic logic. Also see the survey (Gochet and Gribomont, 2006) for a more interdisciplinary
approach and (Halpern, 2003) for a broader account of the different formalisms dealing with the representation
of uncertainty.
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(un)awareness, or even epistemic surprise.3 In that respect, note that other related mental
states such as goal, desire and intention are also necessary if we want to develop logics for
rational agents (such as a computer program, a software or a machine) that need to act on
their environment so as to reach certain goals (possibly in cooperation with other agents).4
Nevertheless, if we are only interested in elucidating the nature of the relationship binding
knowledge to belief, then it is possible to abstract away from these related notions and
identify principles relating knowledge and belief only.
This said, we have to be a bit more explicit and accurate about the kind of principles we
are interested in and also about the modeling assumptions we adopt. Firstly, these princi-
ples have to be interpreted as analytically true relations between the notions of knowledge
and belief. This means that we do not take into account the pragmatic conditions of their
utterance. Therefore, the fact that I cannot reasonably utter the so-called Moore sentence
‘proposition p holds but I do not believe that p’, or the fact that from the mere utterance
of ‘I know that p’, the listener can only infer that I believe that p, will not be explained.
For an account of these pragmatic issues, the interested reader can consult (Lenzen, 2004).
Consequently, we depart from the approach developped in (Hintikka, 1962), because Hin-
tikka studies what he calls epistemic “statements”. According to Hintikka, “a statement
is the act of uttering, writing, or otherwise expressing a declarative sentence. A sentence
is the form of words which is uttered or written when a statement is made” (Hintikka,
1962, p. 6) (my emphasis). On the other hand, our choice of assumptions is supported by
Lenzen’s claim that “one may elaborate the meaning of epistemic expressions in a way
that is largely independent of [...] the pragmatic conditions of utterability” (Lenzen, 2004,
p. 17). Secondly, throughout this paper and as it is usually implicitly assumed in epistemic
logic, we shall follow a perfect external approach. This means that the epistemic state
of the agent under consideration is modeled from the point of view of an external mod-
eler who has perfect and complete access to and knowledge of this state.5 Therefore, the
principles pertain to an agent other than the modeler who states them. Finally, as is often
the case in epistemic logic, we shall be interested only in propositional knowledge, that
is knowledge that something holds, in contrast to non-propositional knowledge, that is,
knowledge of something (such as the knowledge of an acquaintance or a piece of music),
and in contrast to knowledge of how to do something.6
3 Epistemic and doxastic principles
In this section, we will briefly review the most common principles of the logics of knowl-
edge and belief that occur in the literature (spelled out in the form of axioms and inference
3 The notion of justification is dealt with in the field of justification logic (Artemov and Fitting, 2011). Logical
models of (un)awareness have been proposed in economics (Heifetz et al., 2006) and artificial intelligence (Fagin
and Halpern, 1987) with a recent proposal in (Halpern and Reˆgo, 2009). Some models for the notion of epistemic
surprise can be found in (Aucher, 2007) and (Lorini and Castelfranchi, 2007).
4 There are a number of logical frameworks that deal with rational agency: Cohen and Levesque’s theory of
intention (Cohen and Levesque, 1990), Rao and Georgeff’s BDI architecture (Georgeff and Rao, 1991) (Rao and
Georgeff, 1991), Meyer et. al.’s KARO architecture (van Linder et al., 1998) (Meyer et al., 2001), Wooldridge’s
BDI logic LORA (Wooldridge, 2000) and Broersen et. al’s BOID architecture (Broersen et al., 2001)
5 See (Aucher, 2010) for more details on the perfect external approach and its connection with the other
modeling approaches, namely the internal and the imperfect external approaches.
6 (Gochet, 2007) reviews the various attempts to formalize the notion of knowing how in artificial intelligence
and logic.
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rules). They have all been commented on and discussed extensively in the philosophical
literature, and the interested reader can consult (Lenzen, 1978) for more details. That said,
there is currently no real consensus in favour of any proposed set of epistemic principles,
even among computer scientists.
3.1 Epistemic principles
Any normal modal logic contains the axiom K and the inference rule Nec. Hintikka’s
epistemic logic is no exception:
(K(y ! j)^Ky)! Kj (K)
If j then Kj (Nec)
Axiom K and rule Nec have been attacked ever since the beginning of epistemic logic.
They state that the agent knows all tautologies (Nec) and knows all the logical conse-
quences of her knowledge (K). This can indeed be considered as a non-realistic assumption
as far as human agents are concerned, but it is also a problem in numerous applications of
epistemic logic. In the context of computer security, we may want, for example, to reason
about computationally bounded adversaries to determine whether or not they can factor a
large composite number (Halpern and Pucella, 2002). It is not possible, however, to per-
form such reasoning if we assume that the adversary’s knowledge complies to axiom K
and inference rule Nec.7 This problem, named the “logical omniscience problem”, turns
out to be one of the main problems in epistemic logic, and numerous and various proposals
have been made over the years in order to solve it. It undermines not only the notion of
knowledge but also the notion of belief (because, as we shall see, this notion also complies
with the principles K and Nec). In this context, the notion of awareness plays an important
role and it is also relevant to distinguish between implicit knowedge/belief and explicit
knowledge/belief. An agent’s implicit knowledge includes the logical consequences of her
explicit knowledge (Levesque, 1984). We refer the interested reader to (Fagin et al., 1995,
Chap. 9), (Gochet and Gribomont, 2006, p. 157-168) or (Halpern and Pucella, 2011) for
more details on the logical omniscience problem.
Hintikka further claims in (Hintikka, 1962) that the logic of knowledge is S4, which
is obtained by adding to K and Nec the axioms T and 4:
Kj ! j (T)
Kj ! KKj (4)
These axioms state that if the agent knows a proposition, then this proposition is true
(axiom T for Truth), and if the agent knows a proposition, then she knows that she knows
it (axiom 4, also known as the “KK-principle”or “KK-thesis”). Axiom T is often consid-
ered to be the hallmark of knowledge and has not been subjected to any serious attack. In
epistemology, axiom 4 tends to be accepted by internalists, but not by externalists (Hemp,
2006) (also see (Lenzen, 1978, Chap. 4)). A persuasive argument against this axiom has
been propounded by Williamson in (Williamson, 2000, Chap. 5) for the case of inexact
knowledge, that is, knowledge that obeys a margin for error principle. The knowledge that
7 See (Deschene and Wang, 2010) for a survey of approaches to computer security issues which use epistemic
logic.
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one gains by looking at a distant tree in order to know its height is an example of inexact
knowledge. A solution to Williamson’s luminosity paradox is proposed in (Bonnay and
Egre´, 2008) by resorting to a particular semantics for modal logic called “centered seman-
tics”, which validates axiom 4 without requiring the accessibility relation to be transitive.
Axiom 4 is nevertheless widely accepted by computer scientists (but also by many philo-
sphers, including Plato, Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Spinoza and Shopenhauer, as Hintikka
recalls in (Hintikka, 1962)).
A more controversial axiom for the logic of knowledge is axiom 5:
:Kj ! K:Kj (5)
This axiom states that if the agent does not know a proposition, then she knows that
she does not know it. This addition of 5 to S4 yields the logic S5. Most philosophers (in-
cluding Hintikka) have attacked this axiom, since numerous examples from everyday life
seem to invalidate it. For example, assume that a university professor believes (is certain)
that one of her colleague’s seminars is on Thursday (formally Bp). She is actually wrong
because it is on Tuesday (:p). Therefore, she does not know that her colleague’s seminar
is on Tuesday (:Kp). If we assume that axiom 5 is valid then we should conclude that
she knows that she does not know that her colleague’s seminar is on Tuesday (K:Kp)
(and therefore she also believes that she does not know it: B:Kp). This is obviously coun-
terintuitive. More generally, axiom 5 is invalidated when the agent has mistaken beliefs
which can be due for example to misperceptions, lies or other forms of deception.8 As it
turns out, this axiom is often used by computer scientists because it fits very well with the
assumptions they have to make in most of the applied contexts they deal with.
Finally, we examine an axiom which has not drawn much attention in epistemic logic.
This axiom plays, however, a central role in the logic of the notion of ‘being informed’
which has recently been introduced in (Floridi, 2006).
j ! K:K:j (B)
Axiom B states that if j is true, then the agent knows that she considers it possible that
j is true. In other words, it cannot be the case that the agent considers it possible that she
knows a false proposition (that is, :(:j ^:K:Kj)). As pointed out in (Floridi, 2006),
the validity of this axiom embeds a ‘closed world assumption’ similar to the assumption
underlying the validity of axiom 5. As a matter of fact, adding axiom B to the logic S4
yields the logic S5. To be more precise, the sets fT;B;4g and fT;5g are logically equiva-
lent. Therefore, if we assume that axioms T and 4 are valid, then axiom B falls prey to the
same attack as the one presented in the previous paragraph, since in that case we can derive
axiom 5. We may wonder if a similar argument against axiom B holds in the logic KTB,
that is, if we drop axiom 4. Wheeler argues that it is indeed the case (Wheeler, 2012).9
The logic KTB (also known as B or Br or Brouwer’s system) has been propounded by
Floridi as the logic of the notion of ‘being informed’. One of the main differences between
the logic of this notion and the standard logic of knowledge is the absence of introspection
8 (Sakama et al., 2010) and (van Ditmarsch et al., 2011) provide two independent logical accounts of the
notion of lying and other kinds of deception using epistemic logic (resp. dynamic epistemic logic).
9 Wheeler’s argument against axiom B is based on two theorems derivable in the logic KTB. One of them
is the following: K(j ! Ky)! (:K:j ! y). If j stands for ‘the agent sees some smoke’ and y stands for
‘there is fire’, then the consequent of this theorem states that if the agent considers it possible that he sees some
smoke (without necessarily being sure of it), then there is fire. This conclusion is obviously counterintuitive.
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(which is characterized by axiom 4). Floridi claims that his results “pave the way [. . . ]
to the possibility of a non-psychologistic, non-mentalistic and non-anthropomorphic ap-
proach to epistemology, which can easily be applied to artificial or synthetic agents such as
computers, robots, webbots, companies, and organizations” (Floridi, 2006, p. 456). In that
respect, his notion of ‘being informed’ is similar to Voorbraak’s notion of objective knowl-
edge, since, as we already mentioned in Section 2.1, objective knowledge “applies to any
agent which is capable of processing information [and] may very well be a device like a
thermostat or a television-receiver” (Voorbraak, 1993, p. 55). The claim that the notion of
‘being informed’ is an independent cognitive state which cannot be reduced to knowledge
or belief has been attacked recently by Wheeler (Wheeler, 2012). His attack is based on
the argument against axiom B sketched in Footnote 9 (where the notion of knowledge is
replaced with the notion of being informed).
3.2 Doxastic principles
We have to be careful with the notion of belief, since the term ‘belief’ refers to different
meanings: my belief that it will rain tomorrow is intuitively different from my belief that
the Fermat-Wilson theorem is correct. This intuitive semantic difference that anyone can
perceive stems from the fact that the doxastic strength of these two beliefs are not on the
same ‘scale’.
3.2.1 Weak and strong belief
Lenzen argues in (Lenzen, 1978) that there are two different kinds of belief, which he calls
weak and strong belief (or conviction). We will now explain (succintly) the difference
between these two types of belief.10
Weak belief. Assume that the agent conjectures an arithmetical theorem j from a series of
examples and particular cases she has examined. The more examples the agent will have
checked, the more she will ‘believe’ that this theorem holds true. We can naturally give a
probabilistic semantics to this notion of belief and define a corresponding belief operator
as follows:
Brwj , Prob(j)> r
where r is a real number ranging over the interval [0.5;1[. It is read as ‘the agent believes,
at least to the degree r, that j’. The formula Prob(j) represents the subjective probability
the agent assigns to the likelihood of j; the bigger r is, the more the agent ‘believes’ in j .
It turns out that the reasoning principles validated by this notion of belief do not depend
on the value of r. In particular, the principle (Brwj ^Brwy)! Brw(j ^y) is not valid. For
r = 0:5, this notion of belief is called weak belief in (Lenzen, 1978); we denote it here as
Bwj and it stands for ‘the agent weakly believes j’ or ‘the agent thinks j more probable
than not’. Note that this modal operator is studied from a logical point of view in (Herzig,
2003). Instead of resorting to probability to represent this continuum of degrees of belief,
10 A relatively more detailed analysis distinguishing weak from strong belief is also presented in (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2009, p. 414-415). Also see (Lenzen, 1978).
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we could also define a graded belief modality Bnwj , standing for ‘the agent weakly be-
lieves with degree at most n that j’, where n is a natural number.11 A semantics for this
modality based on Ordinal Conditional Functions (OCF) as introduced in (Spohn, 1988a)
is proposed in (Aucher, 2004; Laverny and Lang, 2005; van Ditmarsch, 2005). However,
the intended interpretation of OCF in these papers deviates from Spohn’s intended inter-
pretation, resulting in a definition of the graded belief modality which confuses the notions
of weak and strong belief. As it turns out, the principle (Bnj ^Bny)! Bn(j ^y) is valid
with this OCF-based semantics, unlike with probabilistic semantics.
Strong belief. Now, if the agent comes up with a proof of this arithmetical theorem that
she has checked several times, she will still ‘believe’ in this theorem, but this time with a
different strength. Her belief will be a conviction, a certainty:
Bj , Prob(j) = 1:
That said, her certainty might still be erroneous if there is a mistake in the proof that she
did not notice. We will denote this second type of belief with the formula Bj and read it
as ‘the agent strongly believes (is certain) that j’.12 Unlike weak belief (defined over a
probabilistic semantics), strong belief validates the following axiom:
(Bj ^By)! B(j ^y): (K’)
Note also that, according to probability theory, strong belief entails weak belief:
Bj ! Bwj (BBw1)
and that
Bwj ^By ! Bw(j ^y): (BBw2)
This notion of strong belief is also sometimes called plain belief (Spohn, 1988b) or accep-
tance (Ga¨rdenfors, 1988).
Remark 1 The notions of weak and strong belief are often confused in the literature. This
may lead to apparent paradoxes such as the lottery paradox (Kyburg, 1961). Weak and
strong beliefs are indeed intertwined in the formulation of this paradox. Once these two
notions are clearly identified and separated, the paradox vanishes. As Lenzen writes, “Con-
sider a fair lottery with n tickets, only one of which is the winning ticket. For each ticket j,
the chance of j being the winning ticket then is 1n . Thus, any individual a whose subjective
expectation accords with the objective probabilities will have to presume [...] that j is not
the winning ticket, Bw:p1 ^ : : :^Bw:pn. But since a knows that one ticket will win, he
a fortiori believes (strongly) that one ticket will win, B(p1 _ : : :_ pn). Hence his set of
believings is neither consistent nor deductively closed.” (Lenzen, 1978, p. 38)
11 One should not confuse these graded belief modalities with the graded modalitiesMnj found in (Fine, 1972;
de Rijke, 2000; van der Hoek and Meyer, 1992). Indeed, the intended interpretation of Mnj is ‘there are more
than n accessible worlds that verify j’.
12 The modal operators of weak and strong belief are denoted “Bj” and “Cj” respectively in (Lenzen, 1978).
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Conditional belief. The description of the agent’s doxastic state can be enriched if we also
consider what the agent would believe if she was confronted with new evidence about
the current situation. This has led Lamarre and Shoham in (Lamarre and Shoham, 1994)
to define two operators of conditional belief, Byj and Bywj .13 The semantics of these
operators of conditional belief is based on the semantics of default statements.
A default statement y  j can be read in various ways: ‘if y holds, then typically
j holds’ or ‘if y , then by default j’. The authors of (Friedman and Halpern, 1997) and
(Lamarre and Shoham, 1994) interpret a default statement y  j as a conditional belief
statement: ‘the agent believes j , given assumption y’ or more precisely ‘if y were an-
nounced to the agent, she would believe that j held (before the announcement)’. Given
this intended interpretation, the notion of strong belief Bj (resp. weak belief) corresponds
in this richer setting to the formula B>j (resp. B>wj). This epistemic interpretation of a
default statement, and hence also of its underlying logical semantics, is meaningful. It is
grounded in the relations set up in (Makinson and Ga¨rdenfors, 1989) between AGM the-
ory of belief change (Alchourro´n et al., 1985; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988) and default logic. This
epistemic interpretation is also supported by the fact that the famous Ramsey test basically
defines belief revision in terms of default logic. Indeed, the idea of the Ramsey test is that
an agent should believe j after learning y if and only if he currently believes that j would
be true if y were true (i.e. y  j).
This notion of conditional belief gives rise in turn to a derived doxastic notion called
“safe belief” by Baltag and Smets (Baltag and Smets, 2006, 2008a,b). A safe belief in j is
expressed by the formula B:j?. This notion corresponds intuitively to a belief which can-
not be defeated by any assumption. It is therefore very close to the definition of knowledge
as undefeated true belief proposed by Lehrer and Paxton in (Lehrer and Paxson, 1969),
the only difference being that their notion of knowledge cannot be defeated by any true
assumption. Originally introduced for technical reasons by Boutilier (Boutilier, 1994) to
deal with defeasible reasoning, this operator of safe belief has been reintroduced recently
in the context of dynamic epistemic logic (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007; van Benthem, 2011)
together with the notions of “hard” and “soft” information, in order to deal with belief
revision (unlike “hard” information, “soft” information is revisable).14
Remark 2 If we added dynamics to our framework, as in (Baltag and Smets, 2006, 2008a,b),
then we would also have formulas of the form [y!]Bj , whose reading would be ‘after the
announcement of y , the agent believes j’. This reading is different from the (extended)
reading of our formulas Byj : ‘if y were announced to the agent, she would believe that
j held before the announcement’. The latter operator is a revision of the agent’s beliefs
about the state of the world as it was before the announcement, and the former is a revision
of the state of the world as it is after the announcement. Note, however, that this important
distinction between static belief revision and dynamic belief revision collapses in the case
of propositional formulas y , which most interests us here.
For the rest of the paper, we will be interested only in the notion of strong belief
(certainty) and its conditional version. We will show that convoluted axioms for knowledge
such as .3 and .3.2, which can hardly be expressed in terms of intuitive interaction axioms
13 These two operators are respectively denoted “Cyj” and “Byj” in (Lamarre and Shoham, 1994).
14 For more details, see (van Benthem, 2007; Baltag and Smets, 2006, 2008a,b; van Benthem, 2011) and also
(Pacuit, 2012) in this book.
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dealing with strong beliefs only, can be expressed in terms of interaction axioms dealing
with conditional beliefs, which are easier to grasp.
3.2.2 Principles of strong belief
The logic of (strong) belief is less controversial than the logic of knowledge. It is usually
considered to be KD45, which is obtained by adding to the axiom K and inference rule
Nec (where the knowledge operator is replaced by the belief operator) to the following
axioms D, 4 and 5:
Bj !:B:j (D)
Bj ! BBj (4)
:Bj ! B:Bj (5)
Axioms 4 and 5 state that the agent has positive and negative introspection over her own
beliefs. Some objections have been raised against Axiom 4 (see (Lenzen, 1978, Chap. 4)
for details). Axiom D states that the agent’s beliefs are consistent. In combination with
axiom K (where the knowledge operator is replaced by a belief operator), axiom D is in
fact equivalent to a simpler axiom D’ which conveys, maybe more explicitly, the fact that
the agent’s beliefs cannot be inconsistent (B?):
:B? (D’)
In all the theories of rational agency developed in artificial intelligence (and in particu-
lar in the papers cited in Footnote 4), the logic of belief is KD45. Note that all these agent
theories follow the perfect external approach. This is at odds with their intention to im-
plement their theories in machines. In that respect, an internal approach seems to be more
appropriate since, in this context, the agent needs to reason from its own internal point of
view. For the internal approach, the logic of belief is S5, as proved in (Aucher, 2010) and
(Arlo-Costa, 1999) (for the notion of full belief ).15
3.2.3 Principles of conditional belief
The axioms and inference rules of an axiomatic system called system P form the core
of any axiomatic system that deal with non-monotonic reasoning. A generalized version
of this system (taken from (Friedman and Halpern, 1997)), which allows us to express
boolean combinations of default statements is reproduced below (we omit modus ponens
and all the substitution instances of propositional tautologies). We recall that Byj reads
as ‘the agent (strongly) believes j , given assumption y’ or more precisely ‘if y were
announced to the agent, she would believe that j held (before the announcement)’. We
15 In both philosophy and computer science, there is formalization of the internal point of view. Perhaps one
of the dominant formalisms for this is auto-epistemic logic (R.C.Moore, 1984, 1995). In philosophy, there are
models of full belief like the one offered by Levi, (Levi, 1997) which is also related to ideas in auto-epistemic
logic. See (Aucher, 2010) for more details on the internal approach and its connection to the other modeling
approaches, namely the imperfect and the perfect external approaches.
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leave the reader to find out the natural intuitions underlying these axioms and inference
rules.
Byy (C1)
(Byj1^Byj2)! By(j1^j2) (C2)
(By1j ^By2j)! By1_y2j (C3)
(Byj ^Byc)! By^jc (C4)
If y $ y 0 then Byj $ By 0j (RC1)
If j ! j 0 then Byj ! Byj 0 (RC2)
Note that axiom C2 is an indication that this notion of conditional belief is a gener-
alization of the notion of strong belief rather than weak belief, since, as we have already
noted, (Bj ^By)! B(j ^y) holds, but (Bwj ^Bwy)! Bw(j ^y) does not hold in
general (at least for the probabilistic semantics of weak belief).
4 Principles of interaction
In this section, we will set out the interaction axioms which have been proposed and dis-
cussed in the epistemic logic literature and which connect the notions of belief or condi-
tional belief with the notion of knowledge. We will start by reviewing interaction axioms
that deal with strong belief, and then we will consider interaction axioms that deal with
conditional belief. Note that a classification of certain interaction principles has been pro-
posed in (van der Hoek, 1993).16
4.1 Principles of interaction with strong belief
The following interaction axioms are suggested by Hintikka (Hintikka, 1962) and are often
encountered in the literature:
Kj ! Bj (KB1)
Bj ! KBj (KB2)
Axiom KB1 is a cornerstone of epistemic logic. Just as axiom T, it follows from the
classical analysis of knowledge of Plato presented in the Theaetethus. It turns out that
axiom KB1 is rejected in Voorbraak’s logic of objective knowledge, because his notion
of knowledge does not necessarily apply to humans, but rather applies in general to any
information-processing device. It is adopted by Halpern in (Halpern, 1996), but only for
propositional formulas j . Axiom KB2 highlights the fact that the agent has “privileged
access” to his doxastic state. If we assume, moreover, that the axioms D, 4, 5 for belief
16 The classification is as follows. If X ;Y;Z are epistemic operators, Xj ! YZj are called positive intro-
spection formulas, :Xj ! Y:Zj are called negative introspection formulas, XYj ! Zj are called positive
extraspection formulas, X:Y ! :Zj are called negative extraspection formulas, and X(Yj ! j) are called
trust formulas.
12 Guillaume Aucher
hold, then we can derive the following principle (because in that case :Bj $ B:Bj is
valid):
:Bj ! K:Bj (KB2’)
Axiom KB3 below confirms that our notion of belief does correspond to a notion of
conviction or certainty. This axiom entails the weaker axiom Bj! BwKj (also discussed
in (Lenzen, 1978)).
Bj ! BKj (KB3)
The underlying intuition of KB3 is that “to the agent, the facts of which he is certain
appear to be knowledge” (Lamarre and Shoham, 1994, p. 415) (my emphasis). This in-
formal analysis of the notion of strong belief is formally confirmed by the fact that the
axiom B(Bj! j) is valid in the KD45 logic of belief, and also by the fact that the axiom
Bj ! j , which is a key axiom of the notion of knowledge, is an axiom of the internal
version of epistemic logic (Aucher, 2010).
Lenzen also introduces, in (Lenzen, 1979), the following interaction axiom:
BˆKj ! Bj (KB3’)
This can be equivalently rewritten as Bˆj! BKˆj , where Bˆj and Kˆj are abbreviations
of :B:j and :K:j respectively. In this form, this states that, if j is compatible with
everything the agent believes, then the agent actually believes that it is compatible with
everything she knows that j .
Remark 3 It is difficult to make sense intuitively of the distinction between Kˆj and Bˆj ,
since they both refer to what the agent considers possible. Hintikka proposes in (Hintikka,
1962, p. 3), the following reading: the formula Kˆj should be read as “it is possible, for all
that the agent knows, that j” or “it is compatible with everything the agent knows that j”;
and the formula Bˆj should be read as “it is compatible with everything the agent believes
that j”. In view of our modeling assumptions, we can add that the former possibility is
ascribed externally by the modeler given her knowledge of the epistemic state of the agent,
whereas the latter possibility can be determined internally by the agent herself.
Another interaction axiom also introduced by Lenzen (Lenzen, 1978) defines belief in
terms of knowledge:
Bj $ KˆKj (KB4)
Although this definition might seem a bit mysterious at first sight, it actually makes
perfect sense, as explained in (Lenzen, 1978). Indeed, the left to right direction Bj! KˆKj
can be rewritten K:Kj !:Bj , that is, :(K:Kj ^Bj). This first implication states that
the agent cannot, at the same time, know that she does not know a proposition and be
certain of this very proposition. The right to left direction KˆKj ! Bj can be rewritten
Bˆ:j ! K:Kj . This second implication states that, if the agent considers it possible that
j might be false, then she knows that she does not know j .
Finally, the last interaction axiom we will consider is in fact a definition of knowledge
in terms of belief:
Kj $ (j ^Bj) (KB5)
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It simply states that knowledge is defined as true belief. This definition of knowledge
in terms of belief lacks the notion of justification addressed in the field of justification logic
(Artemov and Fitting, 2011). This definition has also been attacked by philosophers since,
according to it, the agent’s knowledge could simply be due to some “epistemic luck”.
Roughly speaking, this means that the agent could believe a proposition which turns out
by chance to be true, although this belief cannot qualify as knowledge if one considers
the whole epistemic context. An explanation of this notion of “epistemic luck” in logical
terms is proposed in (Halpern et al., 2009a) (but also see (Prichard, 2004)).
The collapse of knowledge and belief. In any logic of knowledge and belief, if we adopt
axiom 5 for the notion of knowledge, axiom D for the notion of belief and KB1 as the
only interaction axiom, then we end up with counterintuitive properties. First, as noted by
Voorbraak, we can derive the theorem BKj! Kj .17 This theorem states that “one cannot
believe to know a false proposition” (Voorbraak, 1993, p. 8). As it turns out, these axioms
are adopted in the first logical framework combining modalities of knowledge and belief
(Kraus and Lehmann, 1986). Moreover, if we add the axiom KB3, we can also prove that
Bj ! Kj . This theorem collapses the distinction between the notions of knowledge and
belief.
A systematic approach has been proposed by van der Hoek to avoid this collapse
(van der Hoek, 1993). He showed, thanks to correspondence theory, that any multi-modal
logic with both knowledge and belief modalities that includes the set of axioms fD;5;KB1;
KB3g entails the theorem Bj!Kj . He also showed, however, that for each proper subset
of fD;5;KB1;KB3g, counter-models can be built which show that none of those sets of
axioms entail the collapse of the distinction between knowledge and belief. So we have
to drop one principle in fD;5;KB1;KB3g. Axioms D and KB3 are hardly controversial
given our understanding of the notion of strong belief. In this case we have to drop either
KB1 or 5. Voorbraak proposes to drop axiom KB1. His notion of knowledge, which he
calls objective knowledge, is therefore unusual in so far as it does not require the agent to
be aware of its belief state. But, as we have said, he clearly warns that this notion applies
to any information-processing device, and not necessarily just to humans. Note that Floridi
has similar reservations against axiom KB1 Floridi (2006), since his notion of being in-
formed shares similar features with Voorbraak’s notion of objective knowledge. Halpern
also proposes in (Halpern, 1996) to drop axiom KB1 and to restrict to propositional for-
mulas. This restriction looks a bit ad hoc at first sight. Dropping axiom 5 seems to be the
most reasonable choice in light of the discussion about this axiom in Section 3.1.
By dropping 5, we then only have to investigate the logics between S4 and S5 as
possible candidates for a logic of knowledge (S5 excluded), as Lenzen did in (Lenzen,
1979).
17 Here is the proof:
1 Kj ! Bj Axiom KB1
2 K:Kj ! B:Kj KB1 : :Kj=j
3 Bj !:B:j Axiom D
4 B:j !:Bj 3, contraposition
5 B:Kj !:BKj 4 : Kj=j
6 :Kj ! K:Kj Axiom 5
7 :Kj ! B:Kj 6,2, Modus Ponens
8 :Kj !:BKj 7,5, Modus Ponens
9 BKj ! Kj 8, contraposition:
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4.2 Principles of interaction with conditional belief
The following axioms KB1y ,KB2y and KB3y are natural conditional versions of the ax-
ioms KB1, KB2, KB3: if y is replaced by > in these three axioms correspond to the
axioms KB1, KB2, KB3. Axioms KB1y and KB2y are first introduced in (Moses and
Shoham, 1993) and are also adopted in (Friedman and Halpern, 1997). Axiom KB3y is
actually introduced in (Lamarre and Shoham, 1994) in the form Byj ! BywK(y ! j).
Kj ! Byj (KB1y )
Byj ! KByj (KB2y )
Byj ! ByK(y ! j) (KB3y )
Axiom KB1y states that, if the agent knows that j , then she also believes that j , and
so on under any assumption y . Note that KB1y entails the weaker principle Kj ! (y !
Byj), which is tightly connected to the Lehrer and Paxton’s definition of knowledge as
undefeated true belief (Lehrer and Paxson, 1969). Indeed, this derived principle states that
if the agent knows that j (formallyKj), then her belief in j cannot be defeated by any true
information y (formally y ! Byj). Note that this very principle entails an even weaker
variant of KB1y introduced in (Moses and Shoham, 1993), namely Kj! (Byj _K:y),
i.e. Kj !  Kˆy ! Byj. Axiom KB2y is a straightforward generalization of KB2. As
for KB3y it states that, if the agent believes j under the assumption that y , then, given
this very assumption y , she also believes that she knows j conditional on y .
The axioms KB4y and KB5y below are also introduced in (Lamarre and Shoham,
1994):
:Byj ! K(Kˆy !:Byj) (KB4y )
Kˆy !:By? (KB5y )
Axiom KB4y is a conditional version of axiom KB2’. It is introduced in (Lamarre
and Shoham, 1994) in the form :Byj! K(K:y _:Byj). Another possible conditional
version of KB2’ could have been :Byj ! K:Byj , and this axiom is indeed adopted
in (Moses and Shoham, 1993). However, “this simpler axiom ignores the possibility of
assumptions which are known to be false, and is valid only for the case ofy =>” (Lamarre
and Shoham, 1994, p. 420).
Axiom KB5y states that, if y is compatible with everything the agents knows, then
her beliefs given this assumption cannot be inconsistent. In particular, if y holds then the
agent’s doxastic state given this assumption cannot be inconsistent: y !:By? (because
y ! Kˆy is valid according to axiom T). Axiom KB5y is introduced in (Lamarre and
Shoham, 1994) in the equivalent form Kˆy ! (Byj !:By:j). Together with KB1y
and system P, it entails that knowledge is definable in terms of conditional belief. This
definition of knowledge actually coincides with the notion of “safe belief” introduced in
(Baltag and Smets, 2008b).
Kj , B:j? (Def K)
Conversely, some definitions of conditional belief in terms of knowledge have been
proposed in the literature. In (Moses and Shoham, 1993), the following three definitions
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are introduced:
Byj , K(y ! j) (Def1 CB)
Byj , K(y ! j)^ (K:y ! Kj) (Def2 CB)
Byj , K(y ! j)^:K:y (Def3 CB)
The third definition entails the second definition, which itself entails the first definition.
However, as one can easily check, none of these three definitions avoids the collapse of the
notions of knowledge and belief. Indeed, if we replace y with> in these three definitions,
we obtain that B>j $ Kj holds. Hence, if the operator B>j (i.e. the operator Bj) is
interpreted as a strong belief operator, then these definitions are untenable.
In the spirit of these three definitions, we propose the following weaker interaction
axiom which does not collapse the distinction between knowledge and belief:
B:y ! (Byj ! K (y ! j)) (KB6y )
If we assume, moreover, that KB1y holds, then this axiom KB6y entails that if the
agent (strongly) believes that y does not hold, then her beliefs given y coincide with her
knowledge giveny , i.e. B:y! (Byj$K(y!j)). Indeed, given KB1y , one can prove
that K(y ! j)! Byj holds.
Finally, we note that the inference rules (RC1) and (RC2) of system P are translated
in (Lamarre and Shoham, 1994) by the following two interaction axioms. The intuitive
meaning of these axioms is clear.
K(y $ y 0)! (Byj $ By 0j)
K(j ! j 0)! (Byj ! Byj 0)
5 Logical formalization
In this section, we will see the standard formal semantics of knowledge, (strong) belief and
(strong) conditional belief. For examples and applications of these semantics in computer
science, the interested reader can consult (Fagin et al., 1995) or (Meyer and van der Hoek,
1995). We will also introduce the convoluted axioms .2, .3, .3.2 and .4 (together with the
class of frame they define), and we will formally define what a (modal) logic is.
5.1 A semantics of knowledge and strong belief
In the rest of this paper,F is a set of propositional letters. We define the epistemic-doxastic
languageLKB as follows:
LKB : j ::= p j :j j j ^j j Bj j Kj
where p ranges over F . The propositional language L0 is the language LKB without the
knowledge and belief operators K and B. The language LK is the language LKB without
the belief operator B, and the language LB is the language LKB without the knowledge
operator K. The formula Bj reads as ‘the agent believes j’ and Kj reads as ‘the agent
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knows j’. Their dual operators Bˆj and Kˆj are abbreviations of :B:j and :K:j respec-
tively.
In epistemic logic, a semantics of the modal operators of belief (B) and knowledge (K)
is often provided by means of a Kripke semantics. The first logical framework combining
these two operators with a Kripke semantics is proposed in (Kraus and Lehmann, 1986).
Epistemic-doxastic model. An epistemic-doxastic modelM is a multi-modal Kripke model
M = (W;RB;RK ;V ) whereW is a non-empty set of possible worlds, RK ;RB 2 2WW are
binary relations overW called accessibility relations, and V :F! 2W is a mapping called
a valuation assigning to each propositional letter p of F a subset of W . An epistemic-
doxastic frame F is an epistemic-doxastic model without valuation. We often denote
RK(w) = fv 2W j wRKvg and RB(w) = fv 2W j wRBvg.
Let j 2LKB, letM be an epistemic-doxastic model and let w 2M . The satisfaction
relationM ;w j= j is defined inductively as follows:
M ;w j= p iff w 2V (p)
M ;w j= j ^j 0 iff M ;w j= j andM ;w j= j 0
M ;w j= :j iff notM ;w j= j
M ;w j= Bj iff for all v 2 RB(w);M ;v j= j
M ;w j= Kj iff for all v 2 RK(w);M ;v j= j:
We denote JjKM = fw 2M jM ;w j= jg. We abusively write w 2M for w 2W . If G
is a set of formulas of LKB, then we writeM j= G when for all j 2 G and all w 2M , it
holds thatM ;w j= j . Likewise, if F = (W;RB;RK) is an epistemic-doxastic frame, then
we abusively write w 2 F for w 2W . If G is a set of formulas of LKB, then we write
F j= G when for all j 2 G and all valuation V , (F ;V ) j= j , and we say that G is valid
inF .
5.2 A semantics of knowledge and conditional belief
Taking up the work of (Friedman and Halpern, 2001), we define the syntax of the language
LKBy inductively as follows:
LKBy : j ::= p j :j j j ^j j Bjj j Kj
where p ranges over F . The symbol > is an abbreviation for p_:p, and Bj is an ab-
breviation for B>j . The language LK is LKBy without the belief operator By , and the
languageLBy isLKBy without the knowledge operator K.
Numerous semantics have been proposed for default statements, such as preferential
structures (Kraus et al., 1990), e-semantics (Adams, 1975), possibilistic structures (Dubois
and Prade, 1991), and k-ranking (Spohn, 1988a,b). They all have in common that they
validate the axiomatic system P originally introduced in (Kraus et al., 1990). A slightly
different version of this system is reproduced in Section 3.2.3. This remarkable fact is
explained in (Friedman and Halpern, 2001), where a general framework based on plausi-
bility measures is proposed. As proved in that paper, plausibility measures generalize all
these semantics. We can nevertheless mention that other logical formalisms dealing with
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conditional beliefs are proposed in the economics literature (Board, 2004). These other
formalisms have been taken up in the field of dynamic epistemic logic (Baltag and Smets,
2006, 2008a,b).
We adopt the general framework of plausibility measures to provide a semantics for
LKBy . Plausibility spaces and epistemic-plausibility spaces are introduced respectively in
(Friedman and Halpern, 1997) and (Friedman and Halpern, 2001). Because these struc-
tures will play a role only in the proofs of the subsequent theorems, their definitions and
the truth conditions of the languageLKBy are postponed until the appendix, together with
the proofs of all the theorems and propositions in this paper.
5.3 Logics of knowledge, belief and conditional belief
A (modal) logic L for a modal languageL is a set of formulas ofL that contains all propo-
sitional tautologies and is closed under modus ponens (that is, if j 2 L and j ! y 2 L,
then y 2 L) and uniform substitution (that is, if j belongs to L then so do all of its sub-
stitution instances (Blackburn et al., 2001, Def. 1.18)). A modal logic is usually defined
by a set of axioms and inference rules. A formula belongs to the modal logic if it can be
derived by successively applying (some of) the inference rules to (some of) the axioms.
We are interested here in normal modal logics. These modal logics contain the formulas
(B(j ! y)^Bj)! By and (K(j ! y)^Kj)! Ky (i.e. axiom K), and the inference
rules of belief and knowledge necessitation: from j 2 L, infer Bj 2 L, and from j 2 L,
infer Kj 2 L (i.e. inference rule Nec). A modal logic generated by a set of axioms G is
the smallest normal modal logic containing the formulas G .
Below, we give a list of properties of the accessibility relations RB and RK that will be
used in the rest of the paper. We also give, below each property, the axiom which defines
the class of epistemic-doxastic frames that fulfill this property (see (Blackburn et al., 2001,
Def. 3.2) for a definition of the notion of definability). We choose, without any particular
reason, to use the knowledge modality to write these conditions.
The logic (KD45)B is the smallest normal modal logic for LB generated by the set
of axioms fD, 4, 5g. The logic (P)By is the smallest logic forLBy containing the axioms
C1-C4 and inference rulesRC1-RC2 from Section 3.2.3.18 For any x2 f.2, .3, .3.2, .4g,
the logic (S4.x)K is the smallest normal modal logic forLK generated by the set of axioms
fT, 4, xg. We have the following relationship between these logics:
(S4)K  (S4.2)K  (S4.3)K  (S4.3.2)K  (S4.4)K  (S5)K
If L and L0 are two sets of formulas (possibly logics), we denote by L+L0 the smallest
normal modal logic containing L and L0. Note that L+L0 may be different from L[L0 in
general, because L[L0 may not be closed under modus ponens or uniform substitution.
18 Note that the axiom (By (j ! j 0)^ Byj) ! Byj 0 and the inference rule from j infer Byj are both
derivable in (P)By . Therefore, (P)By is also a normal modal logic.
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serial: RK(w) 6= /0
D: Kj ! Kˆj
transitive: If w0 2 RK(w) and w00 2 RK(w0), then w00 2 RK(w)
4: Kj ! KKj
Euclidean: If w0 2 RK(w) and w00 2 RK(w), then w0 2 RK(w00)
5: :Kj ! K:Kj
reflexive: w 2 RK(w)
T: Kj ! j
symetric: If w0 2 RK(w), then w 2 RK(w0)
B: j ! K:K:j
confluent: If w0 2 RK(w) and w00 2 RK(w),
then there is v such that v 2 RK(w0) and v 2 RK(w00)
.2: KˆKj ! KKˆj
weakly connected: If w0 2 RK(w) and w00 2 RK(w),
then w0 = w00 or w0 2 RK(w00) or w00 2 RK(w0)
.3: Kˆj ^ Kˆy ! Kˆ(j ^y)_ Kˆ(y ^ Kˆj)_ Kˆ(j ^ Kˆy)
semi-Euclidean: If w00 2 RK(w) and w =2 RK(w00) and w0 2 RK(w),
then w00 2 RK(w0)
.3.2: (Kˆj ^ KˆKy)! K(Kˆj _y)
R1: If w00 2 RK(w) and w 6= w00 and w0 2 RK(w),
then w00 2 RK(w0)
.4: (j ^ KˆKj)! Kj
Fig. 1 List of properties of the accessibility relations RB and RK and corresponding axioms.
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6 Defining knowledge in terms of belief and vice versa
The definability of modalities in terms of other modalities is studied from a theoretical
point of view in (Halpern et al., 2009b). This study is subsequently applied to epistemic
logic in (Halpern et al., 2009a). Three notions of definability emerge from this work: ex-
plicit definability, implicit definability and reducibility. It has been proven that, for modal
logic, explicit definability coincides with the conjunction of implicit definability and re-
ducibility (unlike first-order logic, where the notion of explicit definability coincides with
implicit definability only). In this paper, we are interested only in the notion of explicit
definability, which is also used by Lenzen in (Lenzen, 1979). Here is its formal definition:
Definition 1 (Halpern et al., 2009a) Let L be a (modal) logic forLKB (resp.LKBy ).
– We say that K is explicitly defined in L by the definition Kp, d , where d 2LB (resp.
d 2LBy ), if Kp$ d 2 L.
– We say that B (resp. By ) is explicitly defined in L by the definition Bp , d , where
d 2LK , if Bp$ d 2 L (resp. By p$ d 2 L).
Obviously, putting together an epistemic logic and a doxastic logic, for example (S4)K+
(KD45)B, does not yield a genuine epistemic-doxastic logic since the two notions will not
interact. We need to add interaction axioms. In (Halpern et al., 2009a), only the interaction
axioms KB1 and KB2 suggested by Hintikka (Hintikka, 1962) are considered. In this sec-
tion, we will also add the interaction axiom KB3, suggested by Lenzen (Lenzen, 1978),
since this axiom is characteristic of the notion of strong belief, as we explained in Section
4.1.
6.1 Defining belief in terms of knowledge
We will address the problem of defining belief in terms of knowledge from a syntactic
perspective and from a semantic perspective.
6.1.1 Syntactic perspective
Lenzen is the first to note that the belief modality can be defined in terms of knowledge if
we adopt fKB1;KB2;KB3g as interaction axioms:
Theorem 1 (Lenzen, 1979) The belief modality B is explicitly defined in the logic L =
(S4)K +(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g by the following definition:
Bj , KˆKj (Def B)
Consequently, the belief modality B is also defined by Def B in any logic containing L.
As a consequence of this theorem, the belief modality is also explicitly defined by
Bj , KˆKj in the logics (S4.x)K +(KD45)B+ fKB2;KB1;KB3g, where x ranges over
f.2; .3; .3.2; .4g. This result is in contrast with Theorem 4.8 in (Halpern et al., 2009a),
from which it follows that the belief modality cannot be explicitly defined in the logic
(S4.x)K + (KD45)B + fKB1,KB2g, and so on for any x 2 f.2; .3; .3.2; .4g. We see here
that the increase in expressivity due to the addition of the interaction axiom KB3 plays an
important role in bridging the gap between belief and knowledge. Note that the definition
Def B of belief in terms of knowledge corresponds to the interaction axiom KB4, which
has already been discussed in Section 4.1.
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6.1.2 Semantic perspective
Given that Theorem 1 shows that the belief modality B can be defined in terms of the
knowledge modality K, we would expect that the belief accessibility relation RB could also
be ‘defined’ in terms of the knowledge accessibility relation RK in any frame that validates
L = (S4)K +(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g. The following result, already pointed out in
(Stalnaker, 2006) (without proof), shows that this is indeed the case:
Theorem 2 Let F be a frame such that F j= (S4)K + (KD45)B + fKB1;KB2;KB3g.
Then, for all w;v 2F , it holds that
wRBv iff for all u 2F , wRKu implies uRKv (Def RB)
Note that if we are in a world w such that wRBw, then the accessibility relation for
knowledge RK is Euclidean at w and axiom 5 holds at w. But according to our analysis
in Section 4.1, this also entails that the notions of knowledge and belief collapse into one
another (the proof in Footnote 17 can be adapted to this particular setting). Therefore, in
the logic L= (S4)K +(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g, the following principle holds:
If all the agent’s beliefs hold true,
then her beliefs are actually all knowledge.
If it turns out that the agent has a single erroneous belief, then the conclusion of this
principle obviously does not hold anymore. This principle is intuitively correct and can be
explained informally by the following reasoning. If all my beliefs are correct (true), then
the justification of any specific belief j is also ‘correct’, since this very justification is
based on my own beliefs. Therefore, any specific belief j is justified and this justification is
in a certain sense ‘correct’. Consequently, all my beliefs j turn out in fact to be knowledge.
Note that this principle holds in any logic that extends L. In particular, all the logics
considered in the rest of this paper validate this reasonable principle.
6.2 Defining knowledge in terms of belief
We will address the problem of defining knowledge in terms of belief from a syntactic
perspective and from a semantic perspective.
6.2.1 Syntactic perspective
Defining knowledge in terms of belief depends on the logic of knowledge that we deal
with. As the following proposition shows, knowledge can be defined in terms of belief if
the logic of knowledge is S4.4, but not if the logic of knowledge is S4 and S4.x, where x
ranges over f.2, .3, .3.2g.
Theorem 3 – The knowledge modality K is explicitly defined in the logic (S4.4)K +
(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g by the following definition:
Kj , j ^Bj (Def K)
– The knowledge modality K cannot be explicitly defined in the logics (S4.x)K+(KD45)B+
fKB1;KB2;KB3g for any x 2 f.2; .3; .3.2g.
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This result can be contrasted with Theorem 4.1 in (Halpern et al., 2009a), from which
it follows that the knowledge modality cannot be explicitly defined in the logic (S4.4)K +
(KD45)B + fKB1,KB2g. We see once again that the increase in expressivity due to the
addition of the interaction axiom KB3 plays an important role in bridging the gap between
belief and knowledge.
6.2.2 Semantic perspective
As a semantic counterpart to Theorem 3, the knowledge accessibility relation K cannot be
‘defined’ in a frame that validates the logic L = (S4)K +(KD45)B+ fKB1;KB2;KB3g.
Therefore, there are, in principle, several possible ways to ‘extend’ the belief accessibility
relation RB to a knowledge accessibility relation RK . Indeed, each interaction axiom de-
fines a class of epistemic-doxastic frames (Blackburn et al., 2001, Def. 3.2). This imposes
some constraints on the knowledge accessibility relation RK , though without determining
it completely. We are now going to present these constraints.
The interaction axiom KB1 defines the class of epistemic-doxastic framesF such that
for all w;v 2F ,
If wRBv then wRKv (1)
The addition of the interaction axioms KB2 and KB3 to KB1 defines the class F of
epistemic-doxastic framesF such that for all w;v 2F ,
If wRBw then (wRKv iff wRBv) (2)
So, we still have to specify the worlds accessible by RK for the worlds w such that it is
not the case that wRBw. Indeed, if wRBw, then it holds that RK(w) = RB(w) according to
Equation 2.
In (Stalnaker, 2006), Stalnaker introduces four possible extensions of the belief acces-
sibility relation RB to a knowledge accessibility relations RK . These four possible exten-
sions turn out to correspond to our four logics of knowledge: S4.2, S4.3, S4.3.2 and
S4.4.
1. The first extension consists in the reflexive closure of the accessibility relation RB.
This is the minimal extension possible and it yields the objectionable definition of
knowledge as true belief, whose logic is S4.4.19
2. The second extension consists in defining wRKv as ((wRBw and wRBv) or (not wRBw)).
This is the maximal extension possible and it yields the logic S4.3.2.20
3. The third extension consists in defining knowledge as true belief which cannot be
defeated by any true fact. In other words, a fact is known if and only if it is true and it
will still be believed after any possible truthful announcement.21 This yields the logic
19 That is, S4 plus .4: (j ^ KˆKy)! K(j _y); see Section 5.3.
20 That is, S4 plus .3.2: (Kˆj ^ KˆKy)! K(Kˆj _y); see Section 5.3.
21 For this definition to be consistent, we have to add another constraints that Stalnaker does not mention: in
this definition, knowledge should only deal with propositional facts belonging to the propositional languageL0.
Indeed, assume that the agent believes non-p (formally B:p). Then clearly the agent knows that she believes non-
p by KB2 (formally KB:p). However, assume that p is actually true. If we apply this definition of knowledge,
then, if she learnt that p (which is true), she should still believe that she believes non-p (formally BB:p), so she
should still believe non-p (formally B:p), which is of course counterintuitive. This restriction on propositional
knowledge does not produce a loss of generality because we assume that the agent knows everything about her
own beliefs and disbeliefs.
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S4.3.22 Lehrer and Paxson proposed to add this last condition to the classical notion of
knowledge as justified true belief in order to cope with the ‘Gettier Problem’ (Lehrer
and Paxson, 1969).
4. The last extension consists in weakening the condition of the third extension. Stalnaker
indeed argues in addition that this definition of knowledge as undefeated true belief
should not be a sufficient and necessary condition for knowledge, but rather only a
sufficient one. This contention gives the last possible extension of the accessibility
relation for belief to an accessibility relation for knowledge.
Note that Rott also investigates systematically, but with the help of a ‘sphere’ seman-
tics, how a number of epistemological accounts of the notion of knowledge (including
Nozick’s account) convert belief into knowledge (Rott, 2004). Like us, he does so not by
considering the notion of justification, but by resorting to other properties such as the sta-
bility of beliefs, the sensitivity to truth or the strength of belief and of epistemic position.
7 A derivation of axioms .2, .3, .3.2, .4 from interaction axioms
In this section, we show that the convoluted axioms for knowledge .2, .3, .3.2 and .4
can be derived from understandable interaction axioms if we consider the logic (S4)K for
the notion of knowledge and the logic (KD45)B (or (P)By ) for the notion of belief (or
conditional belief).
7.1 Derivation of axiom .2
Theorem 1 can be equivalently formulated as (S4.x)K+(KD45)B+fKB1; KB2;KB3g=
(S4.x)K +(KD45)B + fKB1;KB2;KB3g+ fBj $ KˆKjg. Note, however, that Lenzen
proved, in (Lenzen, 1979), an even stronger result, which is the following:23
(S4)K +(KD45)B+fKB2;KB1;KB3g= (S4.2)K +fBj $ KˆKjg
This proposition states not only that the belief modality is definable in terms of knowl-
edge, but also that axiom .2 is derivable from the interaction axioms fKB2;KB1;KB3g in
the logic (S4)K +(KD45)B, that is:
.2 2 (S4)K +(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g (.2)
S4.2 is the logic of knowledge propounded by Lenzen and Stalnaker. It is also the
logic of the notion of justified knowledge studied by Voorbraak in (Voorbraak, 1993).
22 That is, S4 plus .3: Kˆj ^ Kˆy ! Kˆ(j ^ Kˆy)_ Kˆ(j ^y)_ Kˆ(y ^ Kˆj); see Section 5.3.
23 Lenzen uses axiom KB30 instead of KB3, but one can easily show that the replacement does not invalidate
the proposition.
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7.2 Derivation of axiom .3
Lenzen does not provide an intuitive characterization of axiom .3 in terms of interaction
axioms. In fact, I believe that such a characterization is not possible if we consider the
language LB only, and that we need to consider a more expressive language. It turns out
thatLKBy is sufficiently expressive to derive .3:
.3 2 (S4)K +(P)By +fKB1y ;KB5y ;KB4yg (.3)
We can recall that KB1y stands for Kj ! Byj , KB5y for Kˆy !:By? and KB4y
for :Byj ! K(Kˆy !:Byj).
The logic S4.3 is propounded as the logic of knowledge by van der Hoek (van der
Hoek, 1993).
7.3 Derivation of axiom .3.2
With a language without conditional belief operator, Lenzen provides, in (Lenzen, 1979),
a derivation of .3.2 by resorting to the interaction axiom KB5 below:
.3.2 2 (S4)K + (KD45)B+fKB1,KB2,KB3,KB5g
where
(Kj ! Ky)^B(Kj ! Ky)! K(Kj ! Ky) (KB5)
As it turns out, Lenzen proves, in (Lenzen, 1979), an even stronger result, which is the
following:
(S4.3.2)K + (KD45)B+fKB1,KB2,KB3g= (S4)K + (KD45)B+fKB1,KB2,KB3,KB5g
Note that the interaction axiomKB5 is a special instance of the definition of knowledge
as true belief, p^Bp! Kp, since p is substituted here by Kj ! Ky . Even with this
observation, it is still difficult to provide an intuitive reading of this interaction axiom.
Instead, we can show that .3.2 is derivable in a logic with conditional belief by means of
the interaction axioms KB5, which is easier to grasp.
.3.2 2 (S4)K +(P)By +fKB1y ;KB5y ;KB4y ;KB6yg (.3.2)
We can recall that the key interaction axiom KB6y stands for B:y! (Byj!K(y!
j)).
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7.4 Derivation of axiom .4
Axiom .4 can be seen as a weakening of axiom 5 since it can be rewritten as follows:
p! (:Kj ! K:Kj). The logic S4.4 is sometimes called the logic of ‘true belief’. This
denomination is indeed very appropriate. Lenzen proves, in (Lenzen, 1979), the following
equation:
(S4.4)K + (KD45)B+fKB1,KB2,KB3g= (S4)K + (KD45)B+fKB4g
where we recall that the interaction axiom KB4 is Kj $ j ^Bj . From this equation, one
can easily derive the following result:
.4 2 (S4)K +(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3;KB5g (.4)
Kutschera argues for S4.4 as the logic of knowledge (Kutschera, 1976).
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have reviewed the most prominent principles of logics of knowledge and
belief, and the principles relating knowledge, belief and conditional belief to one another.
In doing so, we have encountered most of the problems that have beset epistemic logic
during its relatively short (modern) history. We have shown that the convoluted axioms .3
and .3.2 for knowledge, which can hardly be understood in terms of interaction axioms
dealing with (strong) belief only, can be expressed in terms of interaction axioms dealing
with conditional beliefs, which are easier to grasp. We have also demonstrated that the
addition of the interaction axiom Bj ! BKj , which is characteristic of the notion of
(strong) belief, plays an important role in bridging the gap between the notions of belief
and knowledge.
As we explained in Section 3.2, the term “belief” has different meanings: my (weak)
belief that it will be sunny tomorrow is different from my (strong) belief that the Fermat-
Wilson theorem holds true. In this paper, we have only focused on the notion of strong
belief. To deal with the notion of weak belief, we could enrich our language either with
a probabilistic-doxastic operator Prob(j)  r (where r ranges over ]0:5;1[), or with a
graded belief modality Bnj (where n ranges overN), or simply with a weak belief operator
Bwj . This latter language actually corresponds to a language introduced by Lenzen in
(Lenzen, 2004). Its conditionalized version corresponds to the full language of (Lamarre
and Shoham, 1994), which the authors of this paper have completely axiomatized.
Even if our aim was not to argue in favour of a particular logic of knowledge, it is
nevertheless clear from our discussion that, on the one hand, logics like S4.2 or S4.3
are better suited to reasoning about the knowledge of agents in the most general kinds of
situations; on the other hand, the simple and widely used logic S5 is more appropriate for
dealing with particular situations where agents cannot have erroneous beliefs, as we have
already argued at the end of Section 4.1. As a matter of fact, the logic S5 is an enrichement
of these logics with extra assumptions (it is actually a superset of them). More work is
needed to fully understand the logics between S4 and S5 (exclusive) and in particular to
investigate and study their dynamic extensions.
Acknowledgements I thank Manuel Rebuschi and Franck Lihoreau for helpful comments on this paper. I also
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A Plausibility space and epistemic-plausibility space
A.1 Plausibility space
IfW is a non-empty set of possible worlds, then an algebra over W is a set of subsets ofW closed under union
and complementation. In the rest of the paper, D is a non-empty set partially ordered by a relation (so that is
reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric). We further assume that D contains two special elements > and ? such
that for all d 2 D, ?  d  >. As usual, we define the ordering < by taking d1 < d2 if and only if d1  d2 and
d1 6= d2. A (qualitative) plausibility space is a tuple S= (W;A ;Pl) where:
– W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
– A is an algebra overW ;
– Pl :A ! D is a function mapping sets of A into D and satisfying the following conditions:
A0 Pl(W ) => and Pl( /0) =?;
A1 If A B, then Pl(A) Pl(B);
A2 If A;B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, Pl(A[ B) > Pl(C), and Pl(A[C) > Pl(B), then Pl(A) >
Pl(B[C);
A3 If Pl(A) = Pl(B) =?, then Pl(A[B) =?.
We denote byS the class of all (qualitative) plausibility spaces.
A.2 Epistemic-plausibility space and truth conditions
An epistemic-plausibility space is a tupleM = (W;R;V;P) where:
– W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
– RK 2 2WW is a binary relation overW called an accessibility relation;
– V :F ! 2W is a function called a valuation mapping propositional variables to subsets ofW ;
– P :W ! S is a function called a plausibility assignment mapping each world w 2W to a (qualitative)
plausiblity space (Ww;Aw;Plw) such thatWw W .
Let j 2LKBy , letM be an epistemic-plausibility space and let w2M . The satisfaction relationM ;w j= j
is defined inductively as follows:
M ;w j= p iff w 2V (p)
M ;w j= j ^j 0 iff M ;w j= j andM ;w j= j 0
M ;w j= :j iff notM ;w j= j
M ;w j= Byj iff either Plw(JyKw) =? or Plw(Jy ^jKw)> Plw(Jy ^:jKw)
M ;w j= Kj iff for all v 2 RK(w);M ;v j= j
where JjKw = fv 2Ww jM ;v j= jg. We abusively write w 2M for w 2W , and we also writeM j= j when
for all w 2M ,M ;w j= j . If G is a set of formulae (possibly infinite), we writeM j= G whenM j= j for all
j 2 G .
B Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 4 Let F be a frame such that F j= (S4)K +(KD45)B + fKB1;KB2;KB3g. Then, for all w;v 2F ,
it holds that
wRBv iff for all u 2F , wRKu implies uRKv (Def RB)
Proof LetF =(W;RB;RK) be an epistemic-doxastic frame such thatF j=(S4)K+(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g.
Then, because the axioms T, D, 4 and 5 define, respectively, the properties of reflexivity, seriality, transitivity and
Euclideanity, RB is serial, transitive and Euclidean, and RK is reflexive and transitive. Moreover, by the validity
of KB1, RB  RK . We can now prove that (Def RB) holds.
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– From left to right: assume towards a contradiction that there are w;v;u 2F such that v 2 RB(w) and u 2
RK(w) and not v 2 RK(u).
Let p 2 F . We define a valuation V over W such that V (p) = RB(w). Let M be the epistemic-doxastic
model defined byM = (F ;V ). Then,M ;w j= Bp. So,M ;w j= KBp by the validity of KB2. Therefore,
M ;u j= Bp because u 2 RK(w). So, M ;u j= Bˆp because RB is serial. Then, there is t 2 RB(u) such that
M ; t j= p. That is, there is t 2 RB(u) such that t 2 RB(w), because V (p) = RB(w). However, by assumption,
v 2 RB(w). Therefore, because RB is Euclidean, v 2 RB(t). So, t 2 RB(u) and v 2 RB(t). Therefore, by the
transitivity of RB, v 2 RB(u). Then, v 2 RK(u), because RB  RK . This is impossible by assumption. We
therefore reach a contradiction.
– From right to left: assume towards a contradiction that there are w;v 2F such that v =2 RB(w) and for all
u 2F , u 2 RK(w) implies v 2 RK(u).
Let p2F . We define a valuationV such thatV (p) =RB(w). LetM be the epistemic-doxastic model defined
byM = (F ;V ). Then,M ;w j= Bp. Then,M ;w j= BKp by validity of KB3. Because RB is serial, there is
u2 RB(w) such thatM ;u j=Kp. Now, because RB  RK , we also have that u2 RK(w). Then, by assumption
v 2 RK(u). Therefore,M ;v j= p. Then, by the definition of V , we have that v 2 RB(w). This is impossible
by assumption. We therefore reach a contradiction.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 5 – The knowledge modality K is explicitly defined in the logic (S4.4)K+(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g
by Kj , j ^Bj .
– The knowledge modality K cannot be explicitly defined in the logics (S4.x)K+(KD45)B+fKB1;KB2;KB3g
for any x 2 f.2; .3; .3.2g.
Proof The first item in this theorem is owed to (Lenzen, 1979). We will only prove the second item. The proof
method is similar to the proof method for Theorem 4.1 in (Halpern et al., 2009a). If K is explicitly defined in
L = (S4.3.2)K + (KD45)B + fKB1,KB2,KB3g by Kp$ d , then for every epistemic-doxastic modelM such
thatM j= L, it holds that JKpKM = JdKM , and therefore JKpKM 2 fJjKM j j 2LBg. We prove the theorem
by constructing an epistemic-doxastic modelM such thatM j= L and such that JKpKM =2 fJjKM j j 2LBg.
Consider the following epistemic-doxastic frame F = (W;R) whereW = fw1;w2;w3;w4g, RB = f(w1;w1);
(w2;w2);(w3;w2);(w4;w2)g, and RK = RB [ f(w3;w3);(w4;w4);(w3;w4);(w4;w3)g. Let M = (F;V ) be the
epistemic-doxastic model based on F such thatV maps each primitive proposition to fw1;w2;w4g. Clearly,M j=
L. One can also show by induction on the structure of formulas in LB that fJjKM j j 2LBg = ffw1;w2;w4g;
fw3g; /0;Wg, but JKpKM = fw1;w2g.
C Proofs of Equations .3 and .3.2
C.1 Proof of Equation .3
.3 2 (S4)K +(P)By +fKB1y ;KB5y ;KB4yg (.3)
Proof The proof of Equation .3 is purely syntactic. Note first that
By?$ By:y 2 (P)By (3)
This fact will be used in the following proof:
1 Kˆj ^ Kˆy Hypothesis
2 Kˆ(j _y) 1;K
3 :By_j? 2;KB5y
4 :Bj_y:(j _y) 3;Equation 3
5 :Bj_y (:j ^:y) 4; rewriting
6 :(Bj_y:j ^Bj_y:y) 5;C2
7 :Bj_y:j _:Bj_y:y rewriting
8 K
 
Kˆ(j _y)!:Bj_y:j_K  Kˆ(j _y)!:Bj_y:y 7;KB4y
9 K (y !:Bj_y:j)_K(j !:Bj_y:y) 8;T
10 K
 
y ! Kˆj_K  j ! Kˆy 9;KB1y
11 Kˆ(y ^ Kˆj)_ Kˆ(j ^ Kˆy) 1;10;K
12 Kˆ(y ^ Kˆj)_ Kˆ(j ^ Kˆy)_ Kˆ(j ^y) 11;K
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C.2 Proof of Equation .3.2
.3.2 2 (S4)K +(P)By +fKB1y ;KB5y ;KB4y ;KB6yg (.3.2)
We first prove a lemma:
Lemma 1 Let M be an epistemic-plausibility space. If M j= (S4)K +(P)By + fKB1y ;KB4yg, then M j= 
Kˆy ! Kˆ(y ^K (y ! j)! Byj .
Proof Let w 2M and assume that M ;w j= Kˆy ! Kˆ(y ^K(y ! j)). Assume towards a contradiction that
M ;w j=:Byj . Then, by definition, Plw(JyKw) 6=? and Plw(Jy^jKw)Plw(Jy^jKw). Because Plw(JyKw) 6=
?, it holds that M ;w j= :By?. Now, because j= Byy by Ref, we have that j= By:y ! By? by axiom
C2, i.e. j= :By? ! :By:y . Therefore, M ;w j= :By:y . So, by axiom KB1y , M ;w j= Kˆy . Then, by as-
sumption, M ;w j= Kˆ(y ^K(y ! j)). So, there is v 2 RK(w) such that M ;w j= y ^K(y ! j). Therefore,
M ;v j=K(y!j), and soM ;v j=By (y!j) by application of axiomKB1y . Therefore,M ;w j=Byj because
j= Byy . Now,M ;w j= :Byj , and soM ;w j= K  Kˆy !:Byj by axiom KB4y . So,M ;v j= Kˆy !:Byj .
SinceM ;v j= y , we also have thatM ;v j= Kˆy by axiom T. Therefore,M ;v j= :Byj , which contradicts our
previous deduction. So, we reach a contradiction, and thenM ;w j= Byj .
We can now prove Equation .3.2.
Proof LetM be a model and w 2M . Assume thatM j= (S4)K +(K)By +fKB1y ;KB5y ;KB4y ;KB6yg.
Then, by Lemma 1,M j=  Kˆy ! Kˆ(y ^K(y ! j))!Byj , i.e.M j=:Byj!  Kˆ^K  y ! Kˆ (y ^:j).
Now, becauseM j= fKB1y ;KB6yg, it holds thatM j= B:y! (K (y ! j)$ Byj). Therefore,M j= B:y^
Kˆ(y ^:j)!  Kˆy ^K  y ! Kˆ (y ^:j). So,
M j=  KˆK:y ^ Kˆ(y ^j)! Kˆy ^K  y ! Kˆ(y ^j) (4)
Now, assume thatM ;w j= Kˆj ^ KˆK:y . We will show that
M ;w j= K  Kˆj _:y (5)
1. IfM ;w j= K:y , then 5 holds.
2. If M ;w j= Kˆy , then, because M j= (S4)K +(K)By + fKB1y ;KB5y ;KB4yg, it holds that M j= .3 by
Equation .3.
Now, becauseM ;w j= Kˆj by assumption, by application of .3, it holds that eitherM ;w j= Kˆ(y ^ Kˆj) or
M ;w j= Kˆ(j ^ Kˆy).
(a) IfM ;w j= Kˆ(y ^ Kˆj), then by application of 4, it holds that
M ;w j= Kˆy ^K  y ! Kˆ(y ^ Kˆj),
thenM ;w j= K(y ! KˆKˆj)
i.e.M ;w j= K(y ! Kˆj)
i.e.M ;w j= K(:y _ Kˆj)
(b) IfM ;w j= Kˆ(j^Kˆy), then, because j= KˆK:Kˆy$ KˆK:y , we have thatM ;w j= KˆK:Kˆy . Therefore,
by application of 4, it holds that
M ;w j= KˆKˆy ^K  Kˆy ! Kˆ  Kˆy ^j.
So,M ;w j= K  Kˆy ! Kˆj
i.e.M ;w j= K(y ! Kˆj) because j= y ! Kˆy ,
i.e.M ;w j= K(:y _ Kˆj).
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